Conference on Russia Papers

Introduction to the Collection, by editor George Spencer Terry

This chapter argues that the current global political climate is characterised by uncertainty and confusion. As the second half of the Biden presidency approaches, there are concerns about the potential return of Trump from retirement and the potential impact on democracy at home and abroad. The ongoing war in Ukraine has sparked discussions about the need for rearmament in Europe, specifically in Germany, which could potentially benefit NATO. However, this development may also lead to the resurfacing of policy differences within the EU and NATO, which could have negative and unforeseen consequences. The chapter concludes that the global political landscape is in a state of mutation and it is difficult to predict the future with any degree of certainty.

This chapter argues that the situation of the Anglo-German relationship post-Maastricht and post-Brexit is the result of Britain’s attempt to play a balancing role in the face of increasing estrangement from the EU. It engages with the historical precedents and parallels of such situations of disaffection. In September 2022, Britain agreed to increase its commitment to NATO Forward Defence in the Baltic states by expanding its existing battlegroups into brigades. However, much of Britain’s contribution to the collective defence of Europe will be in the maritime domain. In response, Britain is investing heavily in the Royal Navy with new heavy aircraft carriers, F-35 carrier-borne strike aircraft, and new classes of nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines. As a result, the British armed forces are becoming a model for a NATO-focused European Future Force, and the JEF represents the essence of the United Kingdom’s future engagement with Europe. The chapter concludes that it is crucial that the United Kingdom, France, and Germany come to an understanding and move beyond post-imperial delusions on one side and schadenfreude on the other in order to effectively address the challenges facing Europe and the transatlantic community.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022 has shattered Germany’s post-Cold War identity and left its Russia policy in ruins. For 30 years, Berlin pursued a strategy aimed at encouraging Russia to be a partner in European affairs. To this end, it invested heavily in dialogue, trade and bilateral co-operation. German policy makers saw no immediate military threat from Russia and drastically reduced military spending. Successive governments viewed Germany’s increased dependence on Russian gas as a stabilising factor in Europe since they believed that Russia needed the German market as much as Germany needed the gas. The new German government that came to office in December 2021 was deeply divided on the issue of Russia and struggled to respond to Moscow’s build-up of military force on Ukraine’s border. However, Chancellor Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech three days after Russia’s invasion signalled an abrupt change of thinking in Berlin, including the need to rapidly re-invest in defence and reduce Germany’s dependence on Russian energy supplies. Scholz also pledged strong support for Ukraine although the government initially vacillated over weapons deliveries causing dismay in Kyiv. The brutality of Russia’s invasion generated sympathy in German society for Ukraine while leading figures in the Social Democratic Party (SDP) who had promoted expanding the gas relationship admitted that they had misjudged Russia’s intentions. The spectacular exodus of German companies from the Russian market after the imposition of western sanctions signalled the end of an era in which Germany had hoped for the best in its relations with Russia but failed to prepare for the worst.

This essay aims to assess the perception of Russia in the foreign policy establishment thinking of the People’s Republic of China, specifically looking at the most recent developments following the Russian invasion into Ukraine, by examining speeches, statements, and meeting readouts of the PRC’s top foreign policy actors, complemented with an assessment of Chinese academia. The first section of the essay gauges the role of Russia in China’s foreign policy outlook. The second section provides an analysis of selected PRC academic publications after the beginning of Russia’s attack on Ukraine. The essay concludes that the PRC’s policy vis-a-vis Russia is not that of an allied power, but of an interest-based pragmatic neighbour. Consequentially, while the Chinese foreign policy establishment promises deep and integrated cooperation, the PRC foreign affairs academic debate contains a strong motif of a limited support doctrine in relation to Russia.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, both the region and the period following this collapse have been widely characterised as post-Soviet. While there have been some liminal problematisation of the paradigm, it has been generally accepted both popularly and academically as some sort of qualifier for historiographical periodisation and study of this region in both scholarship and for policy-making. This chapter will argue that the post-Soviet is no more for two main reasons. First, Russia no longer wields soft power within the so-called post-Soviet space, and second, Russia is no longer incontestably viewed as the regional hegemon even within the region itself. Such a paradigm shift will have lasting implications for both regional studies and policy-making, but these changes can be guided and informed by the current processes that are playing out both societally and geopolitically in the former region.

The Western response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was significant in its provision of weapons, imposition of sanctions, and support for refugees. This essay argues that a postmodern attitude can explain not only why Putin instigated the war, but also why European NATO and EU member states were unprepared for it. This lack of preparedness presents a significant obstacle to the creation of a new European security order. The postmodern attitude, characterised by a rejection of objective truths and a focus on individual experiences and interpretations, has led to a lack of consensus and a fragmentation of the European security community. As a result, member states were unable to effectively respond to Russia’s actions and were caught off guard by the invasion. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine highlights the need for a renewed focus on the importance of objective truths and a unified approach to security in Europe.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had a significant impact on the West’s perception of Russia. The resilience and leadership of the Ukrainian people, as well as the inflow of Western support, has challenged the longheld assumptions about the political leadership of France and Germany and Germany’s self-proclaimed status as a moral superpower. This essay suggests that the Russian invasion may be the beginning of a new era for Ukraine and a fundamental shift in the moral centre of the European Union.

This essay argues that Russia and its post-Putin leadership will likely exhibit a lack of accountability for the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The war crimes committed by Russian forces during the invasion have exposed a moral crisis within Russian society, reflecting a deep-seated cynicism and lack of morality. This crisis has significant implications for Russian foreign policy and global relations, and is unlikely to be resolved in the short term. The impact of this crisis warrants further analysis, regardless of whether Russia becomes more democratic or Western-oriented.