Journal:Conference on Russia Papers
Volume 3, Issue 1 (2023): The Winter of Russia’s Discontent: Russia’s Futures from Within and Without, pp. 109–126
Abstract
The Black Sea is a strategically important connectivity hub in the wider region and beyond. This paper
examines the interests and priorities of the key stakeholders in the new geopolitical landscape, focusing on
areas such as military security, strategic connectivity, and the use of non-military means of power to promote
peace and stability. The paper adopts a conceptual approach based on the three pillars of future Euro-Atlantic
security architecture, which are closely linked to the security context of the Black Sea. It is crucial for
the future that these stakeholders work together to address the challenges and opportunities in this region.
Journal:Conference on Russia Papers
Volume 3, Issue 1 (2023): The Winter of Russia’s Discontent: Russia’s Futures from Within and Without, pp. 129–141
Abstract
Russia is a country with abundant sources of energy. Its economy is heavily reliant on the oil and gas
industry, which provides revenue for many non-energy sectors such as equipment manufacturing, field services,
and transportation. In the past decade, Russia has made significant contributions to the economic
development of its energy industry. In theory, the current version of Russia’s “Energy Strategy Through 2035”
is based on a comprehensive analysis of the current state of the energy sector in the country. In practice,
however, these trends represent a shift from dependence to addiction. However, Russia’s continued reliance on
its oil and gas industry and disregard for the consequences of its actions will ultimately harm the country’s
economic development.
Journal:Conference on Russia Papers
Volume 3, Issue 1 (2023): The Winter of Russia’s Discontent: Russia’s Futures from Within and Without, pp. 142–155
Abstract
Debates following events in February 2022 in Estonian society have been hot, and despite diverging opinion, there has emerged a mainstream view- point of how to assist Ukraine, how to respond to Russia, what to expect from NATO allies, and how to deal with the inner cohesion of Estonia’s multi-ethnic and multi-lingual society. The least problematic has been the understanding of how to help Ukraine, with Estonia emerging as the leading donating nation per capita. As to Russia, most of the Estonian public and elite supports significantly more severe sanctions than are currently enacted. Although there have been voices which have demanded straightforward intervention of NATO into the conflict, the strongest consensus is behind the view according to which the West should not get directly involved, yet it should indirectly support Ukraine in a greater degree than it has managed to do so far. Despite its membership in NATO, the Estonian political and military elite has been afraid that Russia is about to use the same logic of argument and action against the Baltic States.
Journal:Conference on Russia Papers
Volume 3, Issue 1 (2023): The Winter of Russia’s Discontent: Russia’s Futures from Within and Without, pp. 156–169
Abstract
Russian aggression against Ukraine has put its military might to the test, resulting in substantial losses
and setbacks for Moscow during the war. This article will explore the prospects for the Russian military to
recovery and replenish its lost capabilities in the face of economic scarcity and sanctions. It will look at
how Russia and other major powers were able to modernise and build up their military power in the past, and
whether this phenomenon could be replicated in the future. The article will look at a few preconditions for
military recovery deriving from lost legacy equipment as well as many unknowns for the West in terms of
Russia’s future military trajectory. Through an analysis of these trends and tendencies, the article will
estimate the possible return of Russian military capabilities.
Journal:Conference on Russia Papers
Volume 3, Issue 1 (2023): The Winter of Russia’s Discontent: Russia’s Futures from Within and Without, pp. 170–182
Abstract
Russia has been using trade to balance its domestic and foreign policy interests in a world where the prospects of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) have limited the prospects for direct military confrontation between great powers. This article looks at the role of trade, or more broadly commerce, as it is being used strategically to constrain Russia. It suggests that Russia has turned trade into a domain of warfare, and to this end, the question of whether or not it can constrain Russia is the wrong one.