Conference on Russia Papers

This chapter examines the “human dimension” of European security, focusing on the issue of Ukrainian war refugees and the potential for their repatriation. Pushing people out of Ukraine is becoming one of Russia’s most important strategies for achieving its so-called “special military operation” goals. Cynical attacks on civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, including thermal and electrical generation, combined with information and psychological operations are working towards this goal daily. The consequences of people leaving Ukraine could be painful for both Ukraine’s future and European security. The situation of millions of Ukrainian citizens, who are unable to find fulfilment in the EU and have no place to return home, represents a real catastrophe for the European continent. To avoid this, Ukraine and its allies need to start planning the return of their citizens today, with appropriate adjustments to the state’s socio-economic policy.

This essay argues that Russia and its post-Putin leadership will likely exhibit a lack of accountability for the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The war crimes committed by Russian forces during the invasion have exposed a moral crisis within Russian society, reflecting a deep-seated cynicism and lack of morality. This crisis has significant implications for Russian foreign policy and global relations, and is unlikely to be resolved in the short term. The impact of this crisis warrants further analysis, regardless of whether Russia becomes more democratic or Western-oriented.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had a significant impact on the West’s perception of Russia. The resilience and leadership of the Ukrainian people, as well as the inflow of Western support, has challenged the longheld assumptions about the political leadership of France and Germany and Germany’s self-proclaimed status as a moral superpower. This essay suggests that the Russian invasion may be the beginning of a new era for Ukraine and a fundamental shift in the moral centre of the European Union.

The Western response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was significant in its provision of weapons, imposition of sanctions, and support for refugees. This essay argues that a postmodern attitude can explain not only why Putin instigated the war, but also why European NATO and EU member states were unprepared for it. This lack of preparedness presents a significant obstacle to the creation of a new European security order. The postmodern attitude, characterised by a rejection of objective truths and a focus on individual experiences and interpretations, has led to a lack of consensus and a fragmentation of the European security community. As a result, member states were unable to effectively respond to Russia’s actions and were caught off guard by the invasion. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine highlights the need for a renewed focus on the importance of objective truths and a unified approach to security in Europe.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, both the region and the period following this collapse have been widely characterised as post-Soviet. While there have been some liminal problematisation of the paradigm, it has been generally accepted both popularly and academically as some sort of qualifier for historiographical periodisation and study of this region in both scholarship and for policy-making. This chapter will argue that the post-Soviet is no more for two main reasons. First, Russia no longer wields soft power within the so-called post-Soviet space, and second, Russia is no longer incontestably viewed as the regional hegemon even within the region itself. Such a paradigm shift will have lasting implications for both regional studies and policy-making, but these changes can be guided and informed by the current processes that are playing out both societally and geopolitically in the former region.