This essay argues that Russia and its post-Putin leadership will likely exhibit a lack of accountability for the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The war crimes committed by Russian forces during the invasion have exposed a moral crisis within Russian society, reflecting a deep-seated cynicism and lack of morality. This crisis has significant implications for Russian foreign policy and global relations, and is unlikely to be resolved in the short term. The impact of this crisis warrants further analysis, regardless of whether Russia becomes more democratic or Western-oriented.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had a significant impact on the West’s perception of Russia. The
resilience and leadership of the Ukrainian people, as well as the inflow of Western support, has challenged
the longheld assumptions about the political leadership of France and Germany and Germany’s self-proclaimed
status as a moral superpower. This essay suggests that the Russian invasion may be the beginning of a new era
for Ukraine and a fundamental shift in the moral centre of the European Union.
The Western response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was significant in its provision of weapons, imposition of sanctions, and support for refugees. This essay argues that a postmodern attitude can explain not only why Putin instigated the war, but also why European NATO and EU member states were unprepared for it. This lack of preparedness presents a significant obstacle to the creation of a new European security order. The postmodern attitude, characterised by a rejection of objective truths and a focus on individual experiences and interpretations, has led to a lack of consensus and a fragmentation of the European security community. As a result, member states were unable to effectively respond to Russia’s actions and were caught off guard by the invasion. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine highlights the need for a renewed focus on the importance of objective truths and a unified approach to security in Europe.
This essay aims to assess the perception of Russia in the foreign policy establishment thinking of the
People’s Republic of China, specifically looking at the most recent developments following the Russian
invasion into Ukraine, by examining speeches, statements, and meeting readouts of the PRC’s top foreign policy
actors, complemented with an assessment of Chinese academia. The first section of the essay gauges the role
of Russia in China’s foreign policy outlook. The second section provides an analysis of selected PRC academic
publications after the beginning of Russia’s attack on Ukraine. The essay concludes that the PRC’s policy
vis-a-vis Russia is not that of an allied power, but of an interest-based pragmatic neighbour.
Consequentially, while the Chinese foreign policy establishment promises deep and integrated cooperation, the
PRC foreign affairs academic debate contains a strong motif of a limited support doctrine in relation to
Russia.
This chapter argues that the situation of the Anglo-German relationship post-Maastricht and post-Brexit is the result of Britain’s attempt to play a balancing role in the face of increasing estrangement from the EU. It engages with the historical precedents and parallels of such situations of disaffection. In September 2022, Britain agreed to increase its commitment to NATO Forward Defence in the Baltic states by expanding its existing battlegroups into brigades. However, much of Britain’s contribution to the collective defence of Europe will be in the maritime domain. In response, Britain is investing heavily in the Royal Navy with new heavy aircraft carriers, F-35 carrier-borne strike aircraft, and new classes of nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines. As a result, the British armed forces are becoming a model for a NATO-focused European Future Force, and the JEF represents the essence of the United Kingdom’s future engagement with Europe. The chapter concludes that it is crucial that the United Kingdom, France, and Germany come to an understanding and move beyond post-imperial delusions on one side and schadenfreude on the other in order to effectively address the challenges facing Europe and the transatlantic community.