This essay argues that Russia and its post-Putin leadership will likely exhibit a lack of accountability for the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The war crimes committed by Russian forces during the invasion have exposed a moral crisis within Russian society, reflecting a deep-seated cynicism and lack of morality. This crisis has significant implications for Russian foreign policy and global relations, and is unlikely to be resolved in the short term. The impact of this crisis warrants further analysis, regardless of whether Russia becomes more democratic or Western-oriented.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had a significant impact on the West’s perception of Russia. The
resilience and leadership of the Ukrainian people, as well as the inflow of Western support, has challenged
the longheld assumptions about the political leadership of France and Germany and Germany’s self-proclaimed
status as a moral superpower. This essay suggests that the Russian invasion may be the beginning of a new era
for Ukraine and a fundamental shift in the moral centre of the European Union.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, both the region and the period following this collapse have been widely characterised as post-Soviet. While there have been some liminal problematisation of the paradigm, it has been generally accepted both popularly and academically as some sort of qualifier for historiographical periodisation and study of this region in both scholarship and for policy-making. This chapter will argue that the post-Soviet is no more for two main reasons. First, Russia no longer wields soft power within the so-called post-Soviet space, and second, Russia is no longer incontestably viewed as the regional hegemon even within the region itself. Such a paradigm shift will have lasting implications for both regional studies and policy-making, but these changes can be guided and informed by the current processes that are playing out both societally and geopolitically in the former region.
This essay aims to assess the perception of Russia in the foreign policy establishment thinking of the
People’s Republic of China, specifically looking at the most recent developments following the Russian
invasion into Ukraine, by examining speeches, statements, and meeting readouts of the PRC’s top foreign policy
actors, complemented with an assessment of Chinese academia. The first section of the essay gauges the role
of Russia in China’s foreign policy outlook. The second section provides an analysis of selected PRC academic
publications after the beginning of Russia’s attack on Ukraine. The essay concludes that the PRC’s policy
vis-a-vis Russia is not that of an allied power, but of an interest-based pragmatic neighbour.
Consequentially, while the Chinese foreign policy establishment promises deep and integrated cooperation, the
PRC foreign affairs academic debate contains a strong motif of a limited support doctrine in relation to
Russia.
This chapter argues that the current global political climate is characterised by uncertainty and confusion. As the second half of the Biden presidency approaches, there are concerns about the potential return of Trump from retirement and the potential impact on democracy at home and abroad. The ongoing war in Ukraine has sparked discussions about the need for rearmament in Europe, specifically in Germany, which could potentially benefit NATO. However, this development may also lead to the resurfacing of policy differences within the EU and NATO, which could have negative and unforeseen consequences. The chapter concludes that the global political landscape is in a state of mutation and it is difficult to predict the future with any degree of certainty.