Conference on Russia Papers

This chapter examines whether Russia’s war in Ukraine has fostered a Nordic-Baltic variant of “magical realism” – a strategic narrative in which improbable scenarios are normalised as politically plausible. Drawing on regional history and contemporary threat perceptions, it traces how Russia’s brutality and ambiguity amplify anxieties while institutional assessments (NATO, EUCOM) risk overemphasising Russian reconstitution and underestimating allied advantages. The analysis situates quantitative claims within their social-scientific limits – constructed metrics, neglected error margins, and technocratic drift – and contrasts them with structural realities: Russia’s military attrition, economic strain, and likely preference for sub-threshold coercion over large-scale invasion. It argues that the centre of gravity in the Nordic–Baltic region is not the Baltic Defence Line but the confidence-based social contract that binds ministers, mayors, police chiefs, and citizens. The strategic task is therefore twofold: pierce magical realism with contextualised appraisal, and prioritise resilience against hybrid operations – sabotage, cyber, influence, and aerial incursions – designed to erode public trust and allied resolve.

This chapter explores contemporary dynamics in NATO’s deterrence posture in the Baltic Sea Region. Russia has been increasingly probing NATO reactions across the entirety of the Eastern Flank, normalising such incursions as part of its wider strategy of confrontation with NATO. Engaging with the foundations of deterrence theory, specifically the operative concepts of credibility and costly signalling, the chapter argues that neither NATO’s actual deterrence by punishment nor deterrence by denial postures are sufficient to deter Russian hostile intentions. One of the key reasons for this is a false fear of the so-called escalation trap, as escalation in fact deters a revisionist actor such as Russia that does not harbour genuine insecurity. The recommendation for deterring Russia, therefore, is precisely an embrace of escalation – those actions and strategies in both the Eastern Flank and Ukraine that would credibly signal resolve through readiness to accept high costs by building capability and transparent troop deployments.

Under shifting global power dynamics, Europe faces a dual challenge: Russia’s protracted confrontation with Europe and growing questions over the reliability of US security guarantees. These pressures expose Europe’s vulnerability and demand accelerated defence self-reliance. While recent initiatives have aimed at boosting budgets, industrial modernisation, and procurement, deterrence requires more than resources. The critical gap lies in the capacity to transform investments into deployable capabilities and to engage society across the continent. Two priorities are highlighted: establishing a permanent European multi-domain command-and-control structure to integrate land, maritime, air, space, and cyber components into coherent operational planning, coordinated with political and interagency governance, and strengthening civilian preparedness and resilience; ensuring that governments, private actors, and societies can respond effectively to crises and hybrid attacks. Together with industrial modernisation, these measures provide the foundation of Europe’s strategic autonomy and the most immediate steps towards credible deterrence and resilience in a volatile international environment.

Russian aggression against Ukraine has put its military might to the test, resulting in substantial losses and setbacks for Moscow during the war. This article will explore the prospects for the Russian military to recovery and replenish its lost capabilities in the face of economic scarcity and sanctions. It will look at how Russia and other major powers were able to modernise and build up their military power in the past, and whether this phenomenon could be replicated in the future. The article will look at a few preconditions for military recovery deriving from lost legacy equipment as well as many unknowns for the West in terms of Russia’s future military trajectory. Through an analysis of these trends and tendencies, the article will estimate the possible return of Russian military capabilities.

Debates following events in February 2022 in Estonian society have been hot, and despite diverging opinion, there has emerged a mainstream view- point of how to assist Ukraine, how to respond to Russia, what to expect from NATO allies, and how to deal with the inner cohesion of Estonia’s multi-ethnic and multi-lingual society. The least problematic has been the understanding of how to help Ukraine, with Estonia emerging as the leading donating nation per capita. As to Russia, most of the Estonian public and elite supports significantly more severe sanctions than are currently enacted. Although there have been voices which have demanded straightforward intervention of NATO into the conflict, the strongest consensus is behind the view according to which the West should not get directly involved, yet it should indirectly support Ukraine in a greater degree than it has managed to do so far. Despite its membership in NATO, the Estonian political and military elite has been afraid that Russia is about to use the same logic of argument and action against the Baltic States.