Conference on Russia Papers

The chaotic and dysfunctional politics of the post-Soviet Russia of the 1990s and the early 2000s was viewed at the time as a transition phase on the path to liberal democracy. But in fact, Russia’s trajectory turned out to be something else entirely: a harbinger of where politics in at least some parts of the West were heading. Without the Soviet Union to embody the authoritarian threat, faith in the importance of liberal democracy became hollowed out. In the absence of the gravitas of the Cold War, politics became tabloidised, trivialised, and gamified – and Russia figured out how to hack the game. Through a campaign of active measures, political interference, and weaponised corruption, the Kremlin has aimed to export this model to advance its geopolitical agenda.

This chapter argues that Russia has systematically treated the European Union as a latent strategic actor while simultaneously working to degrade its agency. Through targeted information campaigns, elite capture, espionage, and sabotage, Moscow has exploited the Union’s structural and decisional constraints – vetoes, unanimity, and consensus-driven paralysis – rendering it rhetorically assertive but materially impotent. At the same time, the EU possesses dormant instruments capable of strategic effect: TEU 31(1), TEU 44, crisis procedures, reverse qualified-majority voting, and financial levers that could enforce compliance and coordination. Framed within the paradigm of next-generation warfare, these mechanisms could enable the Union to act collectively without radical treaty change. By mapping Russian interventions against EU institutional weaknesses, the chapter also demonstrates a conscious yet immobilised Europe, performing weakness while nonetheless remaining capable of mobilisation. It concludes that deliberate, audacious activation of existing tools, including coalitions of willing member states, conditional funding, and operationalised crisis powers could awaken the Union as a coherent strategic actor, one that can defend its interests, counter external subversion, and translate its normative authority into tangible geopolitical influence, creating the conditions for a more confident and self-directed European strategic posture.

Under shifting global power dynamics, Europe faces a dual challenge: Russia’s protracted confrontation with Europe and growing questions over the reliability of US security guarantees. These pressures expose Europe’s vulnerability and demand accelerated defence self-reliance. While recent initiatives have aimed at boosting budgets, industrial modernisation, and procurement, deterrence requires more than resources. The critical gap lies in the capacity to transform investments into deployable capabilities and to engage society across the continent. Two priorities are highlighted: establishing a permanent European multi-domain command-and-control structure to integrate land, maritime, air, space, and cyber components into coherent operational planning, coordinated with political and interagency governance, and strengthening civilian preparedness and resilience; ensuring that governments, private actors, and societies can respond effectively to crises and hybrid attacks. Together with industrial modernisation, these measures provide the foundation of Europe’s strategic autonomy and the most immediate steps towards credible deterrence and resilience in a volatile international environment.

This chapter examines the “human dimension” of European security, focusing on the issue of Ukrainian war refugees and the potential for their repatriation. Pushing people out of Ukraine is becoming one of Russia’s most important strategies for achieving its so-called “special military operation” goals. Cynical attacks on civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, including thermal and electrical generation, combined with information and psychological operations are working towards this goal daily. The consequences of people leaving Ukraine could be painful for both Ukraine’s future and European security. The situation of millions of Ukrainian citizens, who are unable to find fulfilment in the EU and have no place to return home, represents a real catastrophe for the European continent. To avoid this, Ukraine and its allies need to start planning the return of their citizens today, with appropriate adjustments to the state’s socio-economic policy.

This article analyses how France’s role in European and global geopolitics is evolving in response to recent challenges, such as Russian aggression in Ukraine, shifting US policies, and China’s rise to power. As the EU’s only nuclear power and a major diplomatic and military force, France is well positioned to strengthen European strategic autonomy, a concept that has long been a part of French foreign policy and is now gaining relevance. While French foreign policy remains rooted in Gaullist principles emphasising national sovereignty and independent decision-making, it has been tempered by increasing interdependence and the need for cooperation with European allies. France has played a leading role in providing political, diplomatic, and military support to Ukraine, and has intensified its efforts towards European defence coordination by expanding partnerships and investing in its defence industry. France’s stance has hardened in relation to Russia, although pragmatism may remain important if future European security necessitates re-engagement with Russia and adaptation to China’s global influence. France’s leadership is paramount in advancing European strategic autonomy, security, and multilateralism, though success hinges on internal consensus and coordinated European action within a rapidly evolving global landscape.

The article examines how Russia employs the concept of a multipolar world to justify a hierarchical and hegemonic vision of international order. Drawing on structural realist theory, it argues that Moscow’s rhetoric of multipolarity masks a project aimed at restoring great power status, securing regional dominance, and weakening Western liberal norms. Using discourse analysis and process tracing, the study reviews Russian foreign policy concepts, security strategies, and speeches by key elites, alongside case studies of institutional participation in SCO, CSTO, EAEU, and BRICS and military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and Kazakhstan. The analysis shows that Russia institutionalises multipolarity politically through alternative regional and global platforms that reinforce its centrality, operationalises it strategically through coercive use of force and veto power, and justifies it normatively through sovereigntist and civilisational narratives. Three intertwined ideological pillars balance of power, sovereignty as civilisational defence, and civilisational pluralism provide moral cover for revisionist policies at home and abroad. The article concludes that Russia’s version of multipolarity is not an inclusive pluralist alternative to the liberal international order, but a fragmented system organised around spheres of influence, hierarchy, and the unconstrained autonomy of great powers.

This chapter explores contemporary dynamics in NATO’s deterrence posture in the Baltic Sea Region. Russia has been increasingly probing NATO reactions across the entirety of the Eastern Flank, normalising such incursions as part of its wider strategy of confrontation with NATO. Engaging with the foundations of deterrence theory, specifically the operative concepts of credibility and costly signalling, the chapter argues that neither NATO’s actual deterrence by punishment nor deterrence by denial postures are sufficient to deter Russian hostile intentions. One of the key reasons for this is a false fear of the so-called escalation trap, as escalation in fact deters a revisionist actor such as Russia that does not harbour genuine insecurity. The recommendation for deterring Russia, therefore, is precisely an embrace of escalation – those actions and strategies in both the Eastern Flank and Ukraine that would credibly signal resolve through readiness to accept high costs by building capability and transparent troop deployments.

This article traces the evolution and enduring value of the concept of strategic culture in understanding state behaviour, particularly in defence and foreign policy. Originating with Jack Snyder’s 1977 analysis of Soviet nuclear doctrine, strategic culture reframed security studies by emphasising historically-rooted beliefs, norms, and institutional patterns rather than purely rational or material calculations. Subsequent scholarship has expanded its application across states, non-state actors and supranational entities. Still, persistent challenges remain, including definitional ambiguity, generalisation, and debates over continuity and change. Despite this, strategic culture continues to shape policy issues, such as tailored deterrence and other aspects of defence planning. The article highlights Jeannie Johnson’s ‘cultural topography’ approach, which systematises cultural analysis through four “lenses”: those of identity, norms, values, and perceptions. Applying this method to Russian policymaking illustrates how deeply embedded perceptions of identity, threat, and power shape its approach to European security under Vladimir Putin’s regime. Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine reflects a strategic culture emphasising historical grievances, the centrality of force, and the personification of state decisions by the leader. The study concludes that understanding these cultural underpinnings is essential for anticipating Russia’s actions, shaping allied policy responses, and informing future strategic stability and deterrence planning.

This chapter examines whether Russia’s war in Ukraine has fostered a Nordic-Baltic variant of “magical realism” – a strategic narrative in which improbable scenarios are normalised as politically plausible. Drawing on regional history and contemporary threat perceptions, it traces how Russia’s brutality and ambiguity amplify anxieties while institutional assessments (NATO, EUCOM) risk overemphasising Russian reconstitution and underestimating allied advantages. The analysis situates quantitative claims within their social-scientific limits – constructed metrics, neglected error margins, and technocratic drift – and contrasts them with structural realities: Russia’s military attrition, economic strain, and likely preference for sub-threshold coercion over large-scale invasion. It argues that the centre of gravity in the Nordic–Baltic region is not the Baltic Defence Line but the confidence-based social contract that binds ministers, mayors, police chiefs, and citizens. The strategic task is therefore twofold: pierce magical realism with contextualised appraisal, and prioritise resilience against hybrid operations – sabotage, cyber, influence, and aerial incursions – designed to erode public trust and allied resolve.