Conference on Russia Papers

In the evolving post-Cold War order, Russian revanchism has emerged not merely as nostalgia for Soviet or tsarist legacies but as a neo-imperial project framed in narratives of historical injustice and civilisational mission. Since Crimea’s 2014 annexation and especially after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it has shown overt disregard for smaller states’ sovereignty, notably in the Baltic region. Central to this agenda is the manipulation of historical memory, where anti-fascist rhetoric serves less as reckoning and more as a weapon to delegitimise states resisting Moscow’s influence. Recent monographs – History of Ukraine (2022) and History of Lithuania (2025) – illustrate this by presenting archival evidence while advancing state-aligned narratives that prioritise ideology over analysis. As Lithuania responds with heightened securitisation, the fusion of sponsored historiography, and weaponised identity politics reveals history’s role in geopolitical disruption. These trends signal a twenty-first-century recalibration of imperial influence, where the battle for meaning precedes that for territory. This article introduces Litvinism as a hybrid threat within the Kremlin’s memory wars, offering the first systematic analysis in English of how Russia weaponises medieval history to destabilise Baltic statehood.

This chapter examines whether Russia’s war in Ukraine has fostered a Nordic-Baltic variant of “magical realism” – a strategic narrative in which improbable scenarios are normalised as politically plausible. Drawing on regional history and contemporary threat perceptions, it traces how Russia’s brutality and ambiguity amplify anxieties while institutional assessments (NATO, EUCOM) risk overemphasising Russian reconstitution and underestimating allied advantages. The analysis situates quantitative claims within their social-scientific limits – constructed metrics, neglected error margins, and technocratic drift – and contrasts them with structural realities: Russia’s military attrition, economic strain, and likely preference for sub-threshold coercion over large-scale invasion. It argues that the centre of gravity in the Nordic–Baltic region is not the Baltic Defence Line but the confidence-based social contract that binds ministers, mayors, police chiefs, and citizens. The strategic task is therefore twofold: pierce magical realism with contextualised appraisal, and prioritise resilience against hybrid operations – sabotage, cyber, influence, and aerial incursions – designed to erode public trust and allied resolve.

This chapter explores contemporary dynamics in NATO’s deterrence posture in the Baltic Sea Region. Russia has been increasingly probing NATO reactions across the entirety of the Eastern Flank, normalising such incursions as part of its wider strategy of confrontation with NATO. Engaging with the foundations of deterrence theory, specifically the operative concepts of credibility and costly signalling, the chapter argues that neither NATO’s actual deterrence by punishment nor deterrence by denial postures are sufficient to deter Russian hostile intentions. One of the key reasons for this is a false fear of the so-called escalation trap, as escalation in fact deters a revisionist actor such as Russia that does not harbour genuine insecurity. The recommendation for deterring Russia, therefore, is precisely an embrace of escalation – those actions and strategies in both the Eastern Flank and Ukraine that would credibly signal resolve through readiness to accept high costs by building capability and transparent troop deployments.