Conference on Russia Papers

This chapter examines whether Russia’s war in Ukraine has fostered a Nordic-Baltic variant of “magical realism” – a strategic narrative in which improbable scenarios are normalised as politically plausible. Drawing on regional history and contemporary threat perceptions, it traces how Russia’s brutality and ambiguity amplify anxieties while institutional assessments (NATO, EUCOM) risk overemphasising Russian reconstitution and underestimating allied advantages. The analysis situates quantitative claims within their social-scientific limits – constructed metrics, neglected error margins, and technocratic drift – and contrasts them with structural realities: Russia’s military attrition, economic strain, and likely preference for sub-threshold coercion over large-scale invasion. It argues that the centre of gravity in the Nordic–Baltic region is not the Baltic Defence Line but the confidence-based social contract that binds ministers, mayors, police chiefs, and citizens. The strategic task is therefore twofold: pierce magical realism with contextualised appraisal, and prioritise resilience against hybrid operations – sabotage, cyber, influence, and aerial incursions – designed to erode public trust and allied resolve.

This chapter explores contemporary dynamics in NATO’s deterrence posture in the Baltic Sea Region. Russia has been increasingly probing NATO reactions across the entirety of the Eastern Flank, normalising such incursions as part of its wider strategy of confrontation with NATO. Engaging with the foundations of deterrence theory, specifically the operative concepts of credibility and costly signalling, the chapter argues that neither NATO’s actual deterrence by punishment nor deterrence by denial postures are sufficient to deter Russian hostile intentions. One of the key reasons for this is a false fear of the so-called escalation trap, as escalation in fact deters a revisionist actor such as Russia that does not harbour genuine insecurity. The recommendation for deterring Russia, therefore, is precisely an embrace of escalation – those actions and strategies in both the Eastern Flank and Ukraine that would credibly signal resolve through readiness to accept high costs by building capability and transparent troop deployments.

Under shifting global power dynamics, Europe faces a dual challenge: Russia’s protracted confrontation with Europe and growing questions over the reliability of US security guarantees. These pressures expose Europe’s vulnerability and demand accelerated defence self-reliance. While recent initiatives have aimed at boosting budgets, industrial modernisation, and procurement, deterrence requires more than resources. The critical gap lies in the capacity to transform investments into deployable capabilities and to engage society across the continent. Two priorities are highlighted: establishing a permanent European multi-domain command-and-control structure to integrate land, maritime, air, space, and cyber components into coherent operational planning, coordinated with political and interagency governance, and strengthening civilian preparedness and resilience; ensuring that governments, private actors, and societies can respond effectively to crises and hybrid attacks. Together with industrial modernisation, these measures provide the foundation of Europe’s strategic autonomy and the most immediate steps towards credible deterrence and resilience in a volatile international environment.

Russia has been using trade to balance its domestic and foreign policy interests in a world where the prospects of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) have limited the prospects for direct military confrontation between great powers. This article looks at the role of trade, or more broadly commerce, as it is being used strategically to constrain Russia. It suggests that Russia has turned trade into a domain of warfare, and to this end, the question of whether or not it can constrain Russia is the wrong one.